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A Fairy Tale in Focus: 
Ecstatic Focalizations in A Christmas Carol
English classics have been out of favour with narratology and narrative 
theorists. The reasons for this may be many. Narrative theory is peculiar for 
being created and maintained as an international endeavour. The leading 
researchers, past and present, include a large cohort of Americans (Seymour 
Chatman, Gerald Prince, David Herman, and Brian Richardson), many 
Frenchmen, including the “founding fathers” of narratology (Gérard Ge-
nette and Tzvetan Todorov), and a considerable number of distinguished 
Germans (F.K. Stanzel, Monika Fludernik). Other of the non-English 
speaking nations are also represented: the Dutch (Mieke Bal), the Polish 
(Michał Głowiński), and the Swiss (Marie-Laure Ryan). In the group we 
are surprised to find few English narratologists. Done over the past several 
decades, the research has formed and focused on something like a canon 
of authors (and works) to whom (and to which) the theorists have paid 
special attention: Gustave Flaubert, Marcel Proust, Henry James, Ernest 
Hemingway among them. Again, none of these are British classics. The re-
sult is that the English canonical authors, Charles Dickens included, have 
not been paid the due tribute of a literary history in the shape of a series of 
studies written with the help of tools fashioned by narratology. The aim of 
this article is to use some such tools and in particular to foreground one of 
the theory’s basic ideas and insights, that of focalization, in an analysis of 
Dickens’s A Christmas Carol (1843). I intend to show, first of all, that this 
kind of analysis makes sense and does not mean doing violence to this mas-
terpiece. I wish to show, on the contrary, that an analysis in pursuit of basic 
narrative strategies both enriches our knowledge of an author’s technique – 
here Dickens’s – and, at the same time, contributes to our understanding of 
the uses of focalization by a skilful and highly self-conscious author.
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In a recent study of A Christmas Carol, the story has been called a fairy 
tale. Harry Stone places the story in a wider context, that of the Christmas 
ghost stories, so popular among the Victorian reading public. The conven-
tion, Stone argues, was used by Dickens for a higher purpose – that is, to 
provide a moral rather than simply scare the reader: “The Christmas books 
[by Dickens] draw their innermost energies from fairy tales: they exploit 
fairy-tale themes, fairy-tale happenings, and fairy-tale techniques. Indeed 
the Christmas books are fairy tales. As Dickens himself put it, he was here 
taking old nursery tales and ‘giving them a higher form.’”1 Stone goes on to 
explain that the design includes the following features: “A protagonist who 
is mistaken or displays false values is forced, through a series of extraordi-
nary events, to see his errors.” Moreover: “Magical happenings dominate 
the story. The crucial action takes place in a dream or vision presided over 
by supernatural creatures who control what goes on.” Finally, “in the fash-
ion of most fairy stories, the moral is strongly reiterated at the end.”2
Without intending this as an objection, let me remark that Stone’s in-
terpretation, interesting and insightful as it is, ignores an issue which – as 
I hope to make clear in the remainder of this article – is crucial to Dick-
ens’s purposes and devices, namely that of perspective or point of view. 
What matters greatly in the Carol is what I  will call a  split or double 
point of view; Dickens uses this device – or makes his spirits use it – as 
a  method of Ebenezer Scrooge’s moral transformation from a  heartless 
miser and an exploitative capitalist into a kind fellow-being and a philan-
thropist. Superficially regarded, the story’s use of the third-person type of 
narration looks common; however, when we analyse it with the help of 
the idea of focalization,3 it turns out to be a bold experiment in narrative 
mood. In my analysis of the Carol I will make use of the existing state 
of knowledge on the subject, without going into polemics, yet proposing 
amplifications. I will chiefly, if critically, avail myself of Mieke Bal’s treat-
ment of the subject in a chapter of her Narratology (second edition, 1997); 
1 Harry Stone, “A  Christmas Carol: Giving Nursery Tales a  Higher Form,” in The Haunted 
Mind: The Supernatural in Victorian Literature, eds. Elton E. Smith and Robert Haas (Lanham, Md. 
and London: The Scarecrow Press, 1999), 11.
2 Stone, “A Christmas Carol,” 11–2.
3 The term does not occur in publications in a “British” spelling.
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but to introduce the problematic I will first avail myself of a passage from 
Gérard Genette’s ground-breaking Narrative Discourse, in which Genette 
explains the need to carefully distinguish “mood” from “voice.” Genette 
regards as regrettable this very common confusion: “a confusion between 
the question who is the character whose point of view orients the narrative 
perspective? and the very different question who is the narrator? – or, more 
simply, the question who sees? and the question who speaks?”4 Mieke Bal 
restates this distinction in the following way: “All these typologies [of nar-
rative points of view] [are] unclear on one point. They do not make a dis-
tinction between, on the one hand, the vision through which the elements 
[of a narrative] are presented and, on the other, the identity of the voice 
that is verbalizing that vision. To put it more simply, they do not make 
a distinction between those who see and those who speak. Nevertheless, 
it is possible, both in fiction and in reality, for one person to express the 
vision of another.”5
This is, however, just the starting point, for focalization comes in varie-
ties; besides, within one narrative, especially if it happens to be a novel, 
say, Madame Bovary, there may occur shifts between those varieties. The 
most basic distinction is between external and internal types of focaliza-
tion. A  narrative is focalized externally, if the represented world is not 
“filtered” through a  consciousness (i.e. not “reflected” in the mind of 
a character). A narrative is focalized internally if the contrary is true; the 
representation of the fictive world is filtered through a mind, usually the 
mind of a character who is a part of and an actor in the portrayed reality, 
often the main protagonist. The latter is the case in the Carol, although, 
as we shall see presently, on close inspection things are far from simple.
Before we proceed, we need to sharpen some of these tools to make 
them useful in our analysis of the complex ways in which Dickens focal-
4 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse. An Essay in Method (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1983; French edition 1972), 186; italics in the original.
5 Mieke Bal, Narratology. Introduction to the Theory of Narrative (Toronto, Buffalo, London: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007; 2nd edition), 143. That Genette’s sharp distinction has not been 
accepted as unproblematic is evidenced by more than one essay in Point of View, Perspective, and 
Focalization: Modelling Mediation in Narrative, eds. Peter Hühn, Wolf Schmid, and Jörg Schönert 
(Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009). Indeed, also in our analysis of the Carol we will 
look at passages that seem to make it doubtful in certain cases.
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izes his narrative. Usually, scholars address the issue as a question about 
“who sees?” or more generally “who perceives?” and leave it at that (Gen-
ette himself has come to realise this shortcoming in his initial approach). 
In my opinion, a broadened and perhaps a deepened approach is not only 
possible but desirable. In what follows I propose to add two other aspects 
or varieties of internal focalization and, for the sake of keeping things 
conveniently simple, I concentrate almost exclusively on how verbs convey 
all three varieties:6
1. verbs of perception, e.g. “to see” and generally verbs designating other 
modes (or acts, in the language of phenomenology) of sensory percep-
tion;
2. verbs of cognition and knowledge, e.g. “to know,” “to understand,” 
“to remember,” “to imagine” (these remind us of the term “reflection” 
in John Locke’s theory of knowledge); this language expresses various 
cognitive acts, or in other words the mental life of a person;7
3. verbs that convey emotional states; to simplify matters, but also to 
revive a  valuable tradition in the British philosophy of the human 
mind, we can call this the language of the passions: “to enjoy,” “to 
grieve,” “to dislike,” etc.; using more contemporary terminology and 
broadening the notion of this variety, we might wish to speak of emo-
tive responses to objects of the focalizing character’s perception or 
cognition.8
6 My typology is similar to, though is not directly based on, that proposed by David Herman; 
see his David Herman, Story Logic: Problems and Possibilities of Narrative (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 307–8. Herman names three types of focalizing verbs: verbs 
of perception, cognition, and emotion. To illustrate the differences Herman quotes a passage from 
Ann Radcliffe’s The Italian. The verbs he emphasises are actually rather ambiguous: “to seem” occurs 
twice and then there is also the phrase “Ellena felt that she understood all the feelings [...].” Herman 
seems to be aware himself that the examples have not been well chosen.
7 Some narratologists, when referring to cognition and its role in focalization, prefer using the 
word “to process.” Not a nice word in itself, perhaps, but helpful in that it names what is important: 
e.g. understanding is a mental process that may consist in making sense of data acquired through 
sensory perception. For Locke’s notion of reflection see An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
II.i.4. (Let me observe in passing that narratologists, also those who study focalization, rarely make 
use of existing epistemologies; this cannot but result in simplification and superficiality.)
8 Compare the phrase “emotional engagement with object domain” used by Jan Christoph 
Meister and Jörg Schönert in their “The DNS of Mediacy,” see Point of View, Perspective, and Focali-
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Already the first chapter, or “stave,” of the Carol provides plenty of il-
lustrative material, especially in the part describing the ghostly encounter. 
On coming home from “his melancholy dinner in his usual melancholy 
tavern,” an action that the narrator does not bother to focalize internally, 
Scrooge is surprised to find his knocker transformed into a human face, 
that of his long-dead partner: “And then let any man explain to me, if 
he can, how it happened that Scrooge, having his key in the lock of the 
door, saw in the knocker, without its undergoing any intermediate process 
of change – not a knocker, but Marley’s face.”9 This is a crucial moment, 
a moment that affects the entire course of the story in that it opens it onto 
a reality that will govern it. But the narrator is far more interested in how 
his human protagonist responds to the fantastic transformation of the 
mundane object. To be sure, Marley’s face is described in some detail, but 
then the focus is on Scrooge. We read:
As Scrooge looked fixedly at this phenomenon, it was a knocker again.
To say that he was not startled, or that his blood was not conscious of 
a terrible sensation to which it had been a stranger from infancy, would be 
untrue. But he put his hand upon the key he had relinquished, turned it 
sturdily, walked in, and lighted his candle.10
This is a  curious passage due to the switching back and forth between 
internal and external focalization: only the italicised part of the second 
sentence uses Scrooge as the focalizer, conveying, albeit in an oblique 
manner, the sensation of terror produced by the inexplicable event. It will 
zation: Modelling Mediation in Narrative, eds. Peter Hühn, Wolf Schmid, and Jörg Schönert, 11–40 
(DNS stands for Dynamic Narrative System).
9 Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol and Other Christmas Books (Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 17; my emphasis.
10 My emphasis. Dickens teases the reader by making Marley pose this philosophical problem 
to the sceptical Scrooge: “What evidence would you have of my reality beyond that of the senses?” 
and then “Why do you doubt your senses” (Dickens, A  Christmas Carol, 21). However, as our 
analysis shows, Dickens does not want to go too far in how the representation of events in his story 
is mediated or filtered through the mind of his protagonist. He never gives up his prerogative, as we 
might put it, to switch to external focalization when he thinks that the reader might need to rely on 
a chunk of “objective” reality.
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be noted – and I believe it is important for the message of the story – that 
the fact of Marley’s face turning back into the knocker is not conveyed 
as Scrooge’s act of vision, but precisely as an action, an objective event: 
“Scrooge looked fixedly,” similarly, describes an act of perception (the 
action of focusing one’s gaze), to be sure, but without however focalizing 
it internally.
Our typology, no matter how sketchy and provisional, already gives one 
an idea about how complex the issue of internal focalization really is. Bal 
herself – despite her determination to narrow down her discussion to the 
first variety (vision, perception) – argues that there is no point in expecting 
a totally objective representation of reality; certainly not, we might add, 
in fiction, and even the less so in fictions in which the mode of narration 
foregrounds, or exposes, as it were, the essential subjectivity of a “world 
picture.” She writes in the chapter on focalization: “Perception depends on 
so many factors that that striving for objectivity is pointless. To mention 
only a few factors: one’s position with respect to the perceived object, the 
fall of the light, the distance, previous knowledge, psychological attitude 
towards the object; all this and more affects the picture one forms and 
passes on to others.”11 But this is part of my point: Why then concentrate 
exclusively on perception, if, even when we do, it soon becomes obvious 
that there is more to internal focalization than that?
Someone may object that, in our approach, the broadening of the sub-
jective side of the issue will result in wiping out the object from the picture. 
I can imagine Bal stating this very objection, because for her focalization 
is “the relation between the vision and that which is ‘seen,’ perceived.”12 
So, if focalization is chiefly about how the focalizer perceptively relates to 
objects that surround him or her, the other aspects do not matter. But we 
have just seen that Bal convincingly argues, as it were against the main 
11 Bal, Narratology, 142. Manfred Jahn finds the term apperception useful: “it is well nigh im-
possible to deny that psychology, cognition, emotion, and ideology have a direct impact on percep-
tion. For this reason the term apperception is often used to designate both the interpretive nature of 
perception and one’s understanding something in ‘frames’ of previous experience.” Manfred Jahn, 
“Focalization,” in The Cambridge Companion to Narrative, ed. David Herman (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010), 101; Jahn’s italics.
12 Bal, Narratology, 142; my emphasis.
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drift of her analysis, that to focus exclusively on perception is perhaps im-
possible. I would add that even if a scholar insisted that it was, she ought 
to reflect critically on the consequences of such delimitation. The problem 
that arises, if we narrow the idea of internal focalization to sensory per-
ception, is how to make sense of that verbal texture and those narrative 
situations that deepen the representation of the focalizer, thus broadening 
our understanding of the uses of this type of focalization? Such is, I sub-
mit, the case with Dickens, determined to render fuller and indeed more 
human this particular narrative device (if this is not too anachronistic 
a manner of putting it). An examination of the Carol confirms this view, 
namely that internal focalization can take us beyond the “pure” phenom-
enology of seeing or vision.
The rather pedestrian and unremarkable issue of speaking in the Carol 
seems to be of secondary importance. Let us, however, remark in pass-
ing that, as always with Dickens, it is not entirely unworthy of note. In 
the figure of the narrator we do recognise, after all, the familiar voice of 
the author, sometimes jovial and facetious (as in the opening comments 
on the similarity between the ghost of Old Hamlet and that of Marley), 
sometimes solemn and moralising (as in the passage describing the al-
legorical representations of Want and Ignorance). Although for us here 
perception and the other methods of immersing the main character in 
the portrayed reality are of primary importance and will chiefly occupy 
us, we must not forget about or ignore his ghostly companions, “the 
Three Spirits,” and their role doing the portraying.13 The fable-like qual-
ity of the story consists in Dickens’s loosening of the strictures of space 
and time. But, of course, Scrooge’s travels are also travels in language, 
in narration. Although in the Carol seeing may be more significant than 
telling – both in a technical and a moral sense – the author and his spirits 
work in perfect unison.
During his didactic trips in space and time in the company of the 
ghosts Scrooge is often “beside himself,” as it were, and for this reason 
13 As we have argued, a satisfactorily broad idea of internal focalization makes it necessary to 
include, besides perception, also cognition and emotion (if we ignore here the ideas of apperception 
and ideology). Mood is not only about the question “Who perceives?” but also about the questions 
“Who knows?” and “What a character feels towards something or someone he or she encounters?”
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we can speak about ecstatic focalization as Dickens’s chief device in this 
fairy tale and a  vehicle for its moral, its spiritual message. Scrooge is 
first thrown into this strange state of ecstasy during a  trip to the past. 
Here he is observing the rowdy Christmas celebrations at Fezziwig’s 
warehouse:
During the whole of this time Scrooge had acted like a man out of his 
wits. His heart and soul were in the scene, and with his former self. He 
corroborated everything, remembered everything, enjoyed everything, 
and underwent the strangest agitation. It was not until now, when the 
bright faces of his former self and Dick were turned from them, that he 
remembered the Ghost, and became conscious that it was looking full 
upon him, while the light upon its head burnt very clear.14
Dickens is capturing here a peculiar state of mind in his protagonist. The 
word “scene” places Scrooge in the position of a spectator, while the entire 
sentence – “His heart and soul were in the scene, and his former self.” – 
suggests participation rather than passive observation; Scrooge has for the 
duration of the experience, abandoned the spectator’s seat and become 
one with his young self. Dickens uses as many as three focalizing verbs to 
describe his state of mind and to help us enter this experience: “to corrobo-
rate” (variety knowledge), “to remember” (variety cognition), “to enjoy” 
(variety emotion). Finally, at its termination, Scrooge re-enters his present 
self, albeit not without some difficulty.
Upon closer inspection, this passage is yet more complex. Yes, it does 
portray the double or split focalization: Scrooge is shown switching be-
tween the two selves. The first sentence, however – “During the whole of 
this time Scrooge had acted like a man out of his wits” – offers an exter-
nal point of view: the ghost is looking at Scrooge, observing him with 
a degree of distance. In our very short passage, then, we have a quick suc-
cession of three different perspectives: an observer (the ghost, the Carol ’s 
principal narrator?)15 comments on Scrooge’s antics, Scrooge’s former self 
14 Dickens, A Christmas Carol, 36.
15 In what follows, I will take the liberty to identify the story’s principal narrator with Dickens.
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is all rapture, finally Scrooge returns to his “proper” self upon the termi-
nation of the vision. Let us now see if other instances of Scrooge’s travels 
with the Spirits confirm that there is some pattern to the ecstasies and 
shifts in focalization.
In the scene that immediately follows the warehouse festivities, Scrooge 
is shown talking to his fiancée; she has decided to part with him, because 
of the Idol of Gain has him now in its grip. This scene is for Scrooge 
a painful recollection, but the Ghost is relentless and makes Scrooge re-
live it. The passage that describes the changes wrought in Scrooge by the 
“master-passion” of avarice is interesting in its ambiguity:
For again Scrooge saw himself. He was older now; a man in the prime of 
life. His face had not the harsh and rigid lines of later years; but it had 
begun to wear the signs of care and avarice. There was an eager, greedy, 
restless motion in the eye, which showed the passion that had taken 
root, and where the shadow of the growing tree would fall.16
What should we think of the type of focalization used here? The old 
Scrooge is ostensibly the focalizer, as the verb “to see” suggests. But does 
he really see all the symptoms of change that are listed? Rather, the fur-
ther we read the more clearly we realise that “the signs of care and ava-
rice” are evident to another observer, either the narrator or, simply, the 
fiancée, even though the passage itself contains no suggestion that she is 
here doing the observing.
Next the Ghost takes Scrooge on a visit to the home of that woman, 
now a matron among a large and happy family. Here, after a brief descrip-
tion of the domestic scene, the principal narrator makes himself almost 
obtrusively present and begins to extol the charms of the woman, lost to 
Scrooge forever like the domestic bliss enjoyed by a man who has taken 
Scrooge’s place at her side:
I should have expected my arm to have grown round it [her waist] for 
a punishment [for the pranks played by her children], and never come 
16 Dickens, A Christmas Carol, 37.
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straight again. And yet I  should have dearly liked, I  own, to have 
touched her lips; to have questioned her, that she might have opened 
them; to have looked upon the lashes of her downcast eyes, and never 
raised a blush; to have let loose waves of hair, an inch of which would be 
a keepsake beyond price: in short, I should have liked, I do confess, to 
have had the lightest license of a child, and yet to have been man enough 
to know its value.17
Like the husband who soon enters, the narrator apparently has taken the 
place of his protagonist at the side of the woman, whom he, Scrooge of 
course, has sacrificed to his idol. But this trick produces another narra-
tive ambiguity: the narrator studies the charms of the woman to instruct 
the male reader how to look at a woman with an eye that “knows the 
value” of what is seen. And yet Scrooge does not fall out of focus. For this 
bizarrely personal passage – as I  read it – prepares us for the outbursts 
of Scrooge towards the end of the entire “stave” (Stave II). First it is: 
“‘Spirit!’ said Scrooge, ‘show me no more! Conduct me home. Why do 
you delight to torture me.’”18 Then, after the domestic scene: “‘Remove 
me!’ Scrooge exclaimed, ‘I cannot bear it!’”19
In Stave III of the Carol, in which Scrooge meets “the Ghost of Christ-
mas Present,” there is surprisingly little to occupy us. Dickens takes great 
pains not to allow us to forget about Scrooge, and so Scrooge is present 
throughout, both in his proper person (accompanying the Ghost on the 
latter’s “travels,” sometimes more like escapades performed at breakneck 
speed) and symbolically, as “an Ogre” (among the Cratchits) and as 
a laughingstock (among the nephew and niece and the rest of the merry 
company); his presence, however, with perhaps one exception, is little 
more than spectral, we might say. Besides, some of the sentiments, for 
instance that bland compassion towards Tiny Tim, register as elicited 
mechanically from the breast of the miser, for we do not feel that he has 
as yet been moved deeply enough.
17 Dickens, A Christmas Carol, 39–40.
18 Dickens, A Christmas Carol, 39.
19 Dickens, A Christmas Carol, 41.
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The exception is another ecstatic moment, one that cannot fail to strike 
us as authentically hilarious, because Scrooge has been made to laugh at 
himself in spite of himself:
“A merry Christmas and a happy New Year to the old man, whatever he 
is!” said Scrooge’s nephew. “He wouldn’t take it from me, but may he 
have it, nevertheless. Uncle Scrooge!”
Uncle Scrooge had imperceptibly become so gay and light of heart, 
that he would have pledged the unconscious company in return, and 
thanked them in an inaudible speech, if the Ghost had given him time. 
But the whole scene passed off in the breath of the last word spoken by 
his nephew; and he and the Spirit were again upon their travels.20
“Imperceptibly” is of course very interesting. “Unconscious” is equally so, 
suggestive in its ambiguity. The emphasis is firmly on Scrooge’s potential 
for spiritual transformation; he may be an Ogre, but there is a layer in his 
soul that has not yet been, at least not entirely, claimed or taken posses-
sion of by the frightful inhuman idol Avarice. Oddly, the Ghost does not 
give Scrooge time to “process” his entirely spontaneous and unexpected 
change of mood (if this is what “imperceptibly” conveys). In other words, 
Scrooge is not “finished” yet; Dickens is not finished with his human 
mascot. To bring to completion the tale’s neat pattern – based on time’s 
three-dimensionality – Scrooge needs to encounter one more Ghost or 
Spirit. More importantly and terrifyingly, he needs to face, not another 
self of Scrooge, but a void of himself.
The situation in the penultimate Stave, in which Scrooge meets “the last 
of the Spirits,” “the Ghost Christmas Yet to Come,” is in some respects 
similar, yet also grimly different and spookily surreal. The crucial mo-
ment, carefully prepared for (Scrooge is kept ignorant as to the identity of 
the newly deceased person), comes when he has to, in a manner of speak-
ing, identify his own corpse. This does not take place until the end of 
this Stave. Dickens builds an eerie situation over which the “immovable” 
Spirit, pointing with its “inexorable finger” “from the grave to [Scrooge] 
20 Dickens, A Christmas Carol, 60.
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and back again,” seems to be presiding as the coroner, or perhaps an ex-
ecutioner. To take in the import of the scene, a long quotation is needed:
The room was very dark, too dark to be observed with any accuracy, 
though Scrooge glanced round it in obedience to a  secret impulse, 
anxious to know what kind of room it was. A pale light, rising in the 
outer air, fell straight upon the bed; and on it, plundered and bereft, 
unwatched, unwept, uncared for, was the body of this man.
Scrooge glanced towards the Phantom. Its steady hand was pointed 
to the head. The cover was so carelessly adjusted that the slightest raising 
of it, the motion of a finger upon Scrooge’s part, would have disclosed 
the face. He thought of it, felt how easy it would be to do, and longed 
to do it; but he had no more power to withdraw the veil than to dismiss 
the spectre at his side.
Oh, cold, cold, rigid, dreadful Death, set up thine altar here, and 
dress it with such terrors as thou hast at thy command; for this is thy 
dominion! But of the loved, revered, and honoured head thou canst not 
turn one hair to thy dread purposes, or make one feature odious. It is not 
that the hand is heavy, and will fall down when released; it is not that 
the heart and pulse are still; but that the hand was open, generous, and 
true; the heart brave, warm, and tender, and the pulse a man’s. Strike, 
Shadow, strike! And see his good deeds springing from the wound, to 
sow the world with life immortal!
No voice pronounced these words in Scrooge’s ears, and yet he heard 
them when he looked upon the bed. He thought, if this man could be 
raised up now, what would be his foremost thoughts? Avarice, hard deal-
ing, griping cares? They have brought him to a rich end, truly!
He lay in the dark, empty house, with not a man, a woman, or a child 
to say he was kind to me in this or that, and for the memory of one kind 
word I will be kind to him. A cat was tearing at the door, and there was 
a sound of gnawing rats beneath the hearthstone. What they wanted in 
the room of death, and why they were so restless and disturbed, Scrooge 
did not dare to think.21
21 Dickens, A Christmas Carol, 70; emphasis in the original.
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Again a dizzying whirling of different perspectives, different views and 
visions hovering, as it were, over the anonymous dead body.
First, a  moment of suspense, a  moment of uneasy anticipation: the 
heart has already told Scrooge what he will find behind the veil. And he 
seems powerless in the presence of this truth. Dickens is of course careful 
not to lose sight of the allegorical dimension. Very recently the reader has 
seen Scrooge “out of his wits,” eager to join his “former self.” To unveil his 
future self is pointless; he knows what he must find. We all know. And so 
now Scrooge has become Everyman, and, to the tune of this realisation, 
Dickens in person takes the initiative and sermonises in exultation over 
the powerlessness of Death. Righteousness is a mighty guarantor of im-
mortality, and so a man “of good deeds” is in the presence of cruel death 
ready to receive the mortal blow. But these are not Scrooge’s words or con-
victions, even though – miraculously – he hears them! The spiritual state 
in which he finds himself at the foot of his death-bed (and so at this point 
there is one more splitting of the selves),22 he is a spirit doomed, like Mar-
ley before him, to remain purgatorially chained to the burden of his sins.
Scrooge’s reflection is masterfully concluded: “They have brought him 
to a rich end, truly!” Dickens cannot refuse himself the pleasure of pun-
ning and so he catches this opportunity to use “rich” also in a  mean-
ing that perhaps is not exactly opposite to the common one, but which 
stresses the painful irony of the entire scene.23 At the same time, we have 
in this sentence an excellent example of what in narrative theory is called 
free indirect speech or discourse.24 Utterances of this kind blur the nor-
mally clear distinction between the voice of the narrator and that of the 
22 Most strikingly in the reflection on resurrection: “He thought, if this man could be raised 
up now, what would be his foremost thoughts?” The first “to think” sustains of course the internal 
focalization, while “this man” and “his thoughts” creates a chasm of moral and existential distance 
between Scrooge and “his” corpse.
23 The reader is perhaps expected to recall at this point the way in which Marley, unexpectedly 
for Scrooge, changes the meaning of the word “business.” In reply to Scrooge’s “‘But you were al-
ways a good man of business, Jacob, […].’” the perturbed ghost replies: “‘Mankind was [supposed 
to be] my business. The common welfare was my business; charity, mercy, forbearance, and benevo-
lence, were, all, my business.’” Dickens, The Christmas Carol, 23–4.
24 Gerald Prince provides this definition of free indirect discourse: “Free indirect discourse […] 
has the grammatical traits of ‘normal’ indirect discourse, but it does not involve a tag clause (‘he 
said that,’ ‘she thought that’) […]. Furthermore, it manifests at least some of the features of the char-
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character (provided of course that these are not identical). And indeed, 
we cannot be certain here who the speaker is. The use of the third per-
son singular suggests that we hear the narrator; but the other features, 
such as the exclamation mark, indicate that the sentence is an echo of 
a thought in the mind of Scrooge. And so does the entire situation. Free 
indirect speech is a device that brings the narrator and the character close 
together, to make room, as it were, in a  third-person narrative for the 
voice and the mind of the principal character. Here, Scrooge is expected 
to arrive at this conclusion, although once more we find here also the 
voice of Dickens unwilling to give up his function as the penitent’s (and 
also the reader’s) assistant.
The paragraph that follows (the fifth in our quotation) is a  superb 
example of Dickens’s technical daring, if we may call this his decision to 
sustain the narrator/focalizer ambiguity of the concluding exclamation 
of the previous paragraph: “He lay in the dark, empty house, with not 
a man, a woman, or a child to say he [Scrooge] was kind to me [the man, 
or the woman, or the child] in this or that, and for the memory of one 
kind word I will be kind to him.” The emphasised clauses are like shadows 
echoing (the reader will excuse this lame mixed metaphor!) these unut-
tered sentences: “Mr. Scrooge, thank you for doing this!” and “I  must 
be kind to Scrooge for the kind words he once said to me!” Because of 
the complex syntax, mine may not be the only possible interpretation of 
this passage, but this complexity only brings home more convincingly 
Dickens’s overriding concern: human beings owe one another as “fellow 
passengers to the grave” this kind of exchange of kindnesses, both in 
word and in deed.
There is no need to dwell on the disturbing moment at the end of this 
Stave, in which Scrooge reaches the final, much-desired recognition (in 
the tragic sense). Let us note that the bizarre question he asks: “Am I the 
man who lay upon the bed?” [emphasis of the original] further sustains 
the splitting of his identity. As he pleads with the “last” Spirit: “I am not 
the man l was,” we realise that the process of his conversion has reached 
acter’s enunciation […].” A Dictionary of Narratology (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2003; rev. edition), 34.
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completion.25 The haunting question that remains is, who is this man 
Scrooge? How many selves is he made of?
There is need to dwell upon the scenes contained in Stave V, in which 
we observe the “translated” miser make amends, and we are grateful 
that the artistry of Dickens has prevented them both from the mawkish-
ness of a  sentimentalist and triumphalism of a  preacher. The last one, 
in which Scrooge, to his great satisfaction apparently, manages to gull 
Bob Cratchit into believing that he is still his wonted self is as hilarious 
as it is moving. For Scrooge such an act of impersonation may be proof 
of successful reformation. Focalization, we may say, has given way to 
impersonation. This theatricality emphasises that we are now in a  truly 
festive mood.
For us this dissembling feat may be proof of Dickens’s self-assurance as 
a storyteller and a moralist dwelling peacefully in one person. So, is really 
Scrooge a means and a method to attain integration? Not only in or for 
the reader – for that is or was the obvious authorial intention, but for 
Dickens as well? If this does not look like an unwarranted leap of the im-
agination, then the lesson is that integration can and perhaps even should 
be attained through ecstasy. A memorable moment comes in Stave II of 
the Carol, where Dickens uses the word “ecstasy.” The scene shows the 
old Scrooge in tears at the sight of “his poor forgotten self as he used 
to be.”26 Scrooge certainly has reasons to pity his former self. And yet 
it is a strange scene, a scene that brings in, as we will eagerly nowadays 
say, the theme of intertextuality. For the poor forgotten self is not really 
lonely; he is reading and reading intently. And the stuff that keeps him 
warm is the proper stuff that tales of fantasy are made on. The next thing 
we see is the imaginary beings. The next thing we see is the fantastic be-
ings that populate the tales (Ali Baba, Valentine, Robinson Crusoe and 
Friday, and a host of others leap out of the pages, at the beckoning of the 
Ghost’s wand or finger and come to life. Upon seeing Ali Baba “outside 
the window” Scrooge “exclaims in ecstasy”: “‘Why, it’s Ali Baba.’ […] ‘It’s 
dear old honest Ali Baba! Yes, yes, I know!” So, a Spirit on a mission to 
25 Dickens, The Christmas Carol, 75.
26 Dickens, The Christmas Carol, 31.
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reform a  fallen Christian raises shadows of exotic creatures in order to 
wrench that soul from the clutches of crass materialism? Yes. And yes, 
again. For Dickens, that will do, if do it must. For isn’t his Christmas 
fairy tale also, like those fantastic tales that help young Scrooge forget 
himself, a means to reach an ecstatic state of the soul, a  state that may 
be the first step (and perhaps a necessary one) on the path that leads to 
the Celestial City?
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